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Ordinance No. IV of 1839 drafted by the Royal Commission of 
1836, abolished 'censorship' and provided against 'abuses of the 
consequent liberty of publishing printed writings.' 1 
Before the said ordinance was enacted, printing was a Govern-
ment monopoly. According to law, no trade or business could be exercised 
in Malta without a previous Government licence. By simply refusing to 
grant any licence to exercise the trade of printer, Government ensured that 
nothing was printed in Malta except at its own press and with its previous 
permission which could be withheld without any reason being given. 2 
Since Ordinance IV of 1839 censorship has never been re-
introduced in Malta. However, the absence of legal restraint before 
publication is guaranteed by the Press Act of 1974 and not by our Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the 
court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. 3 
Freedom of expression cannot be adequately protected merely 
by limiting the use of remedies which may affect it, nor by avoiding any 
form of prior restraint. If there is a right to free expression, than it is 
essential that it should be reflected in the substantive law, for it is 
this which ultimately determines the climate within which journalism 
and other forms of public debate may take place. It is no use insist-
ing that there is freedom to 'publish and be damned' if at the end of 
the day fear of damnation exerts too great a restraint, for the substantive 
law then becomes itself a form of prior restraint even if its remedies are 
limited to subsequent operation. 4 
Once this is appreciated, it becomes imperative to enquire how 
the law of libel affects the newspapers' right to write and publish their 
material freely while highlighting the importance of the defence of fair 
comment. 
It is much to be desired that newspapers and television should be 
free to being to the notice of the public, any matter of public interest or 
concern. The law recognises this already by the defence of fair comment on 
a matter of public interest. 5 
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According to L.J. Scott in Lyon v Daily Telegraph Ltd., "the 
right of fair comment is one of the fundamental rights of free speech and 
writing which are so dear to the British nation, and it is of vital1 importance 
to the rule of law on which we depend for our personal freedom.'' 
In Malta, the defence of fair comment has been accepted by our 
courts even before the 1961 Constitution introduced a justiciable bill of 
rights. 
press. 
The courts are conscious of the paramount importance of the 
" ... 11-kuncett tal-liberta ta/-istampa kif qed titviluppa //um, u 
Ii dil-qorti temmen liajna fih hu Ii figura pubblika blial 
gurnalista, jew trade unjonista, blial imputat, mhux biss 
gliandhom id-dritt Ii jikkritikaw per etempju Ministru u 
jiccensuraw 1-operat tiegliu, itda gliandhom dover Ii jaglimlu 
don meta hu 1-kat.. Pero 1-kitba trid tkun gusto, fil-limiti imposti 
mi/1-ligi, u bat.at a fuq fat ti sostan:tjalment veri. L-imputat jista' 
jibqa cert u miegliu 1-gurnalisti kollha Ii certament mhux ser 
tkun din il-qorti Ii tnaqqaslu mi/1-liberta tal-kelma u tal-
espressjoni, anzi tridu jikkonvinci ruliu Ii 1-alijar protez:tjoni 
glial don id-dritt sagrosant jsibha fil-qorti. Pero din il-qorti trid 
taglimilha cara wk oil Ii 1-liberta tal-kelma ma tifssirx Ii anki jekk 
qed tgliid fatti Ii temmen Ii huma veri, tista' taqbad u tuta 1-
aggettivi ko//ha adattati u mhumiex, u imbagliad m,eta xi liadd 
jigbidlek 1-atten:tjoni, meta 1-jroga tkun saret, kif vo/garment 
jingliad, inti tiddef endi ruliek bi/Ii ssostni sinifikat differenti 
glia/1-dawk 1-aggettivi mi/Ii jkun taglihom id-di:tjunarju jew kif 
jifhimhom ku/liadd. Jekk taglimel don, ma tistax titielied bis-
serjeta anzijkollok tbati 1-konsegwenzi. " 6 
Unfortunately our courts have refrained from elaborating the 
defence of fair comment. Nor have they been very instrumental in granting 
our newspapers more liberty. Today the defence of fair comment is 
essentially the same as that expounded by Judge Harding over thirty years 
ago. Then, as now, the notion of the defence of fair comment has remained 
the same, in spite of the fact that in this span of time the legislator has 
attached more importance to the liberty of speech by embodying it in the 
constitution as a fundamental human right, a right which was not 
constitutionally enshrined at the time of Judge Harding's utterance. 
According to the law of Malta, three requisites are required to 
constitute a fair comment: 
(1) a matter of public interest. ''il-fatti bhala tali jridu jkunu fuq kwistjoni 
ta' interess pubbliku. " 7 
6. 11-Pulizija v Alphonse Farrugia, Perit Michael Falzon v Paul Spiteri - Sth 
December 1980 decided by Magistrate Agius. 
7. 11-Pulizija v Perit M. Falzon, Sandro Calleja v Paul Spiteri 1977. Mizzi J. 
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(2) Facts must be correct. "Biex 1-eccezzjoni tal-fair comment tigi anki 
hiss konsedrata, hu mehtieg li tkun saret narrazzjoni sostanzjalment ei:atta 
tal-fatti li fuqhom il-kumment hu bai:at. " 8 
(3) Comment must be honest. "Il-kliem ... fil-kwadru tac-cirkostanzi u 
tal-kuntest Ii ntqalu ma kienux akkompanjati bl-intenzjoni difamatriei, 
imma hiss bl-intenzjoni Ii jsir kumment gust moderat, onest u doverus, bla 
eccessi u sekondi fini u minghajr il-movent ta' interessi ohra, u b'dan ii-mod 
jeskludi fic-drkostanzi konguri, I-element psikologiku tal-ingurja cioe 1-
animus injurandi. " 9 
In England the defence of fair comment may be recapitulated by 
quoting the case Slim v Daily Telegraph 1968. The Court of Appeal held 
that: "In considering a plea of fair comment it is not correct to canvass all 
the various imputations which different readers may put upon the words. 
The important thing is to determine whether or not the writer was actuated 
by malice. If he was an honest man expressing his genuine opinion on a 
subject of public interest, then no matter that his opinion was wrong or 
exaggerated or prejudiced, and no matter that it was badly expressed so that 
other people read all sorts of innuendos into it, nevertheless, he has a good 
defence of fair comment. His honesty is the cardinal test. He has nothing to 
fear, even though other people may read more into it. I stress this because 
the right of fair comment is one of the essential elements which go to make 
up our freedom of speech. We must ever maintain this right intact. It must 
not be whittled down by legal refinements. When a citizen is troubled by 
things going wrong, he should be free to publish his letter. It is often the only 
way to get things put right. The matter must of course be one of public 
interest. The writer must get his facts right: and he must honestly state his 
real opinion. But that being done, both he and the newspaper should be 
clear of any liability. They should not be deterred by fear of libel actions." 
The difference between the law of Malta and the law of England 
lies in the so called element of "mens rea". English law is concerned with the 
publisher's intention. In Maltese law the publisher's specific intention is 
irrelevant. What matters is the consequence of the publication. 10 
The result is that English law affords protection to the 'honest 
man expressing his genuine opinion on a subject of public interest, then no 
matter that his opinion was wrong or exaggerated, or prejudiced: and no 
matter that it was badly expressed so that other people read all sort of 
innuendos into it; nevertheless he has a good defence of fair comment'. The 
defence of fair comment in an identical case here in Malta, would not be of 
much use. 
On the 5th October 1928 in the case Mr. Masini v A vukat 
Bartolo, the court laid down the principle that in a trial on proceedings for 
libel, if the defendant did not succeed in proving the truth of the writing, 
8. 11-Pulizija v A. Farrugia. Perit M. Falzon v Paul Spiteri 1980. Magistrate Agius. 
9. Reginald Cilia v Lionel Pugliesevich 1963. Harding J. 
10. "Mhux dak Ii seta' talvolta kellu f'rasu min kiteb 1-artikolu Ii jghodd imma dak Ii 
fil-fatt kiteb." Dom Mintoff v Thomas Medley et ne 1953. 
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but satisfied the court that he was in good faith and that he had a just 
reason for publicising the facts proving that he honestly believed the 
allegations to be true and that he exercised due care and diligence in 
ascertaining such allegations, then he may be exempted from criminal 
liability. 
In effect this judgement gave the newspapers further protection. 
The judgement gives newspapers nothing less then a defence of fair 
information on a matter of public interest. 
Fifty years after our courts delivered this judgement Lord 
Denning came out strongly in favour of the defence of fair information on a 
matter of public interest. 
" ... in many cases, however, the newspapers are not able to 
rely on fair comment because they cannot prove that the facts stated are 
true. Where this is the case, there is sometimes a need for the newspapers to 
be granted a privilege - a qualified privilege - for them to give fair 
information to the public when it is in the public interest for them to do so. 
This privilege may be defeated if the newspaper is actuated by malice, but 
otherwise it should avail the newspaper." "I would like this principle 
emerging: if the newspaper or television receive or obtain information fairly 
from a reliable and responsible source, which it is in the public interest that 
the public should know, then there is a qualified privilege to publish it. They 
should not be liable in the absence of malice.'' 11 
Unfortunately, such a defence, does not probably exist any 
longer in our law. In fact our courts, in Police vs Joseph James Scorey 1949, 
have rejected the defence that the article was published in the honest belief 
that it was true. 
Judge Harding rejected the defence's plea arguing that in the 
Masini - Bartolo case, the court was relying on S 21 of Ordinance XIV of 
1889 which made the animus injurandi the basic ingredient of the offence. 
As long as our courts interpret the word 'knowingly' 12 so as to 
include both specific and generic intent, technicalities will prevail over our 
right to a free press which is yet unafraid to expose itself to the chilling 
effect of libel. 
Interest in the freedom of expression is at its peak within the 
area of official conduct and political debate. 
The public conduct of a public man is a matter of public interest 
and may be discussed with the fullest freedom. It may be made the subject 
of hostile criticism and hostile animadversions; provided the language of 
the writer be kept within the limits of an honest intention to discharge a 
public duty, and is not made as a means of promulgating slanderous and 
malicious allegations ... and whether instead of a fair, reasonable and 
honest comment upon the circumstances, it was made an opportunity for 
gratyfing personal vindictiveness and hostility .13 
11. Lord Denning - 'What next in Law?' - Part V; 7 Fair Information, page 188. 
12. As found in S 25 of the Press Act 1974. 
13. Il-Pulizija v Joseph Micallef Stafrace 1959 - Judge Harding. 
I 
l 
1984 PUBLISH AND BE DAMNED 41 
"Huwa veru Ii kull Cittadin ghandu d-dritt jikkommenta 
f'gurnal u anki, jekk jidhirlu, b'mod ahrax, indipendentement minn jekk il-
qarrej ma jikkonvidix 1-opinjoni tieghu fuq materja ta' interess publiku; 
imma ma jistghax fil-kitba tieghu jattribwixxi lill-ufficjal publiku ghemil 
dii:onest fl-esekuzzjoni tal-kariga teghu minghajr ma jipprova 1-allegazzjoni 
tieghu. '' 14 
Our courts have accepted the principles that considerable latitude 
must be given to political writers, 15 after all the object of this branch of the 
law is not to interfere with temperate discussion of politcal questions. 16 
The pronouncements which our courts have made regarding 
official conduct and political debate are at face value conducive to free 
expression. 
However, when one reviews the judgements decided by our 
courts, one has to come to the conclusion that the balance is invariably 
tipped in favour of the Plaintiff. Suffice it to mention the following facts to 
substantiate this statement: 
(a) Falsity is presumed. 
"Il-falsita tal-kliem ingurjuzi hija prei:unta favur il-kwerelant." 
Buttigieg vs Montanaro, 15th December 1964. 
(b) As soon as the court decides that the publication is defamatory, 
damages follow automatically, without any need for the plaintiff to 
prove actual injury. It is only in this field of the law, that damages are 
awarded for "mental suffering." In the case Captain Agius vs J. 
Attard Kingswell et noe 19860; damages were given without any 
inquiry into the commercial damages, the plaintiff claimed to have 
suffered after the publication. 
Highly controversial statement of comment is proved to be factual and true 
the courts will uphold the "pre-eminence of free expression". 
In America, the law of libel is subject to the pre-eminence of the 
concept of free expression, and therefore the balance is tipped in favour of 
the defendants (i.e.) the newspapers. 
In America, in 1964, the Warren Court, sweeping aside 175 years 
of settled law regarding libel, held in New York Times Co. vs Sullivan -
that the First Amendment bars a state from awarding a public official 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his office, unless the 
falsehood is published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless 
disregard whether it is true or false. 17 
This decision enables the American Press to pursue investigations 
into corruption and other abuses of public position, relieving newspapers, 
reporters, editors, and publishers of the worry that they might have to pay 
14. 11-Pulizija v Dr. Carmelo Caruana 1958 - Judge Flores. 
15. 11-Pulizija v Nestu Laiviera 1953 - Judge Harding. 
16. 11-Pulizija v Joseph Micallef Stafrace 1959 - Judge Harding. 
17. Archibald Cox - Freedom of Expression - 1981. 
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damages to a public person whom they injure by publishing what some 
judge finds to be a false and defamatory statement of fact. 18 
In Gertz vs Robert Welch, Inc. 1974, the Burger Court yielded 
to more cautious weighing and balancing of interests. The court found the 
interests to be the circulation of information and debate upon matters of 
public significance, on the one side, and the individual's private personality 
- his dignity and worth - on the other .19 
In the case of a public figure, Justice Powell argued that the 
imposition of liability for anything less than an intentional or reckless 
falsehood, carries too much risk of self censorship resulting in suppression 
of truth, but the balance is to be struck more favourably for a private 
person because a private person, unlike a public official or public figure, 
does not voluntarily expose himself to risk of falsehood, and lacks 
opportunity to command attention for his reply. 20 
Four rules emerged from this case: 
I. The Constitution (of America), gives the press absolute freedom to 
publish statements about public figures that turn out to be false, 
unless the publisher knew they were false or recklessly disregarded 
warning of their untruth. 
2. The first amendment frees the press from liability to other persons, 
when there is neither negligence nor more serious fault. 
3. Conversely, the states are free to expose liability for defamation of 
a private person, if the publisher or broadcaster is at fault. 
4. Damages may be avoided to compensate for "actual injury", but 
punitive damages will not be allowed unless the statements were 
intentionally or recklessly false. Actual injury includes impairment 
of standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental 
suffering. Injury must be proved however; it cannot be presumed 
from the fact of publication. 
Our constitutional court cannot be as liberal and egalitarian as 
the American Courts. The reason is that the very wording of our Con-
stitution is more restrictive than the First Amendment. Nonetheless, our 
Constitution grants us the right to free speech. Our legislator did not give us 
such a freedom to protect academic and harmless discussion. S. 42 of the 
Constitution of Malta was written primarily to afford a defence to those men 
who are prepared to denounce injustice and who wish to expose deception in 
Government. The fact that our constitution gives us such right, indicates 
that our democratic framework is profoundly committed to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. 
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